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REINHARD, C. J.-This was an action to recover damages
for injures inflicted upon the plaintiff below by falling through
an opening in the floor of the defendant's school building,
where he had gone under the following circumstances: The
plaintiff had been a former student at the school, and upon the
evening in question had returned at the invitation of certain
of the students to attend the meeting of a literary society, of
which they were members. The meeting was held, and the
invitation to plaintiff (with those to others) was sent out with
the approval of the college authorities, who furnished light and
heat for the occasion. The plaintiff left the meeting-room,
alone, upon a necessary purpose, and turning into a hallway
fell into an opening in the floor, which had been only partially
protected, and received the injury for which he complained.
The defence, beside that of contributory negligence was
upon the ground that the plaintiff was merely a trespasser
or at most a licensee, to whom no duty of care was owed, and
to whom they were consequently not liable. Upon the above

suggested evidence the court held that "the jury were justified
in drawing the inference that the appellee was neither a trespasser nor a mere licensee, but was there upon at least the
implied invitation of the college authorities." . . . "and that
the appellants owed him the duty to protect him from dan-
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gerous pitfalls or other obstructions when he was in the
building.
Verdict for the plaintiff affirmed, and a rehearing was subsequently denied.
THE

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE LIABILITY OF A PROPERTY

OWNER FOR INJURIES TO GUESTS AND TO INVITED PERSONS.

That the insufficiency of language has been the cause of
much uncertainty in the law, as well as in other branches of
learning, is demonstrated by a consideration of the principles
involved in this case. It has been unquestioned law for many
years that the owner or occupier of real estate owes certain
duties to those who come thereon, according to the cause of
their entry, and the nature of the danger to which they are
exposed. To trespassers it is only against active injury, to
licensees it is to give notice of hidden dangers or traps, while
to invited persons (as that term is understood by the law), the
owner is bound to use reasonable care, having respect to the
person and character of the business to be carried on to save
But the
his guest from injury while upon the premises.
difficulty which is instantly met in this class of cases, is to disIn other
tinguish between licensees and invited persons.
words to ascertain the exact scope of the word "invitation"
as legally used. The language cited with approval in the
principal case from Evansville, &c., R. R. v. Griffln, IOO Ind.
221, is characteristic of that found in many. " If the owner
or occupant of lands, by any enticement, allurement or inducement, causes others to come upon or over his lands, then he
assumes the obligation to persons so coming to provide a
reasonably safe and suitable way for the purpose." The
latitude in these words, however, is so great as to render them
of very little practical value, for they can easily be stretched
to cover a great many cases whith no court would include
within the invitation class. Indeed, the earliest case in which the
property owners' liability to guests was considered, is against a
liberal construction. In Southcote v. Stanley, I H. & N. 247
(1856), the plaintiff was the guest of the proprietors of a
hotel, and was injured by the breaking of a glass door, which
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was in an unsafe condition. The court refused a recovery,
POLLOCK, C. B., upon the ground that a social visitor must be
considered as a member of the family into which he comes,
and consequently entitled to no greater care. "Whilst he remains there," said the Chief Baron, "he is in the same position
as any other member of the establishment so far as regards the
negligence of the master or his servants." And Baron BRAMWELL, upon the ground that he was a licensee only, and
entitled to no special care, saying, " If a person ask a visitor
to sleep in his house and the former omitted to see that the
sheets were properly aired, whereby the visitor caught cold, he
could maintain no action, for there was no act of commission,
but simply of omission." The extreme position of Baron
P6LLOCK has never been accepted and cannot be maintained:
Pollock on Torts, * 427 ; Clerk v. Lindsell on Torts, 59.
And while the general thought of Baron BR.WE.LL is less
open to attack, the illustration is not good, for if a person ask
another to sleep in his bed, he is bound in common prudence
(which is the test of all these relative duties) to see that the
bed is as safe as such places usually ate, and a simple warning
of a possible danger will not, it is submitted, be sufficient.
This decision has been sufficient, however,to justify a number
of writers in saying, that the test of " Invitation" is direct or
indirect pecuniary gain, and that a guest in the ordinary
acceptation of the word is not an invited person at all, but
simply a licensee.
Thus Campbell (on Negligence), says: "Invitation is inferred where there is a common interest or mutual advantage,
while a licensee is inferred where the object is the mere pleasure
or benefit of the person using it." And again, "Invitation
therefore, in the technical sense of the word, differs from invitation in the ordinary sense-implying the relation of host and
guest. In the case of host and guest it would be thought hard
that the hospitality of the former should expose him to the
responsibilities implied by the business relation. The guest
must take the premises as he finds them, with any risk of their
disrepair; although the host is bound to warn his guest of anyconcealed danger upon the premises known to himself."
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Mr. Pollock says (Torts, *427): "A guest. (that is a visitor
who does not pay for his entertainment) has not the benefit of
the legal doctrine of invitation in the sense now before us,
He is in point of law nothing but a licensee."
And Wharton says (Negligence, § 350): "A man does not
undertake to make his house safe so far as concerns mere
visitors."
In the late case of Pluimmer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, the
couri said: "It is well settled that to come under an implied
invitation, as distinguished from a mere license, the visitor
must come for a purpose connected with the business in which
the occupant is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on
there. There must at least be some mutuality of interest in
the subject to which the visitor's business relates, although
the particular thing which is the subject of the visit may not
be for the benefit of the occupant."
Such a doctrine as this has the undoubted effect of simplifying the question, and a great many cases are easily and
rightly disposed of by it. In Benson v. The Baltimore Ti-action Co., 26 Atlantic Rep. 937 (1893), the plaintiff was one of
a class of boys who was given permission by the president of
the defendant company to visit their power house and view the
machinery. While walking about he fell into an open pit of
hot water, which was allowed to remain unfenced, and was
seriously scalded. A recovery was denied, upon the ground
that there was no possible mutuality of interest in the visit, as
it was only for the instruction of the boys, and the simple
permission could not be construed as an invitation. In this
case the mutuality -rule is applied with great force and the
result is very satisfactory. In the following cases decisions
were reached which are entirely conformable to the rule:
In The Oil Co. v. Norton, 7o Tex. 400; S. C., 7 S. W. 756,
a person was permitted to enter the defendant's works to speak
to an employ6 and was injured while there.
In Woolwine's Ad. v. C. & C. R. R., 15 S. E. 81 (W. Va.),
1892, the plaintiff went on defendant's land to speak to a
telegraph operator employed there and was injured.
In .Lachat v. Lutz, 22 S. W. 218 (Ky.), 1893 the plaintiff
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entered defendant's premises to deliver a message from an
employ6 and was injured while there.
In Steeger v. Van Sec/in, 132 N. Y. 499, a woman was
injured by the fall of a stairway in an old building, where she
had gone to seek her children, who where accustomed to play
there.
N. Y.
In Laramore v. The Crown Point Iron Co., io
391 (1886), the plaintiff went to the defendant's mine to seek
employment, and was injured by some of the machinery there
operated.
In Walker v. Winstaztlj, 155 Mass. 301 (189 1), the plaintiff

went into defendant's house to seek kindling Wood and fell
down a flight of steps. See, also, Gillis v. Penna.R. R., 59 Pa.
129 (1868); Redegan v. B. & 31 R. R., 155 Mass. 44 (1891);
Metcalf v. Steamship Co., 147 Mass. 67 (1888); Parker v.
PortlandPub. Co., 69 Me. 173; Sullivan v. Waters, 14 Ir. C.
L. 460 (1864).
In none of these cases was a recovery allowed, and in none
-was there such a mutuality of interest as to bring them
within the rule. To this extent then the rule appears true.
But it must also be recollected that they are all typical license
zases, and without a forced construction there was no "inducement or allurement" held out. Nor was there any express
invitation to enter the premises where the accident happened.
The nearest was a license solicited and granted. It cannot be
said, therefore, that the mutuality rule gathers any material
strength from them as against the ordinarily understood distinction between license and invitation.
On the other hand the rule includes all those cases which
are universally admitted to fall within the "invitation " class,
such as where one who enters the store of another to buy
goods and is injured while there: Clapp v. Mear, 134 Pa. 203
(189o); Gordon v. Cummings, 152 Mass. 513 (189o); Freedv.
Cameron, 4 Rich. L. 228 (185 i); and where the defendant's

excursion wharf was so defective that the plaintiff, who was
lawfully thereon, fell and was injured: O'Callaghanv. Bode,
84 Cal. 489 (1890); Campbellv. PortlandSugarRefining et al.,
62 Me. 552 (1873).
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In these cases, there was a clear mutuality of interest or
direct or indirect expectation of pecuniary profit resulting
from the visit. A storekeeper is considered as constantly
holding out an invitation to all persons, desiring to do business with him to enter for that purpose, and, if this invitation
is accepted, the responsibilities of invitation attach to the
host: Clapp v. Mlfear, supra.
With this understanding of the mutuality rule, the principal case becomes of great interest, as the decision of the
court would bring it within the invitation class, and, consequently, the interest of the defendant in the visit of the plaintiff must be found. But did the college derive any benefit
from the visit of the plaintiff? He came simply as a visitor
to the meeting of the literary society, and the only part played
by the college itself was in permitting the invitation to be
sent to the plaintiff and allowing their building to be used for
the meeting. By a forced construction of the facts of the
case it might be argued'that the invitation was to be considered
as an advertising scheme, which, eventually, might result in
some benefit to the defendants, and thus the requirements
of the rule be satisfied.
But such wa- not the position of the court, nor was the
mutuality rule mentioned, but having invited the plaintiff upon
the premises, and, consequently, in any sense of the word,
"induced" or "allured" him to enter, they "owed him the
duty of protection from dangerous pit falls or other obstructions while in the building," and this is nothing more nor less
than admitting the plaintiff to the class of invited persons
without the existence of any mutuality of interest in the visit.
The case of Davis v. The Central Congregation Society, 129
Mass. 167 (1 88o), was somewhat similar and equally irreconcilable with the mutuality rule as laid down by the text writers
already quoted. The plaintiff was injured by reason of the
dangerous condition of a way leading to the defendant's
church, where she had gone upon an invitation sent to another
congregation of which she was a member. A recovery was
allowed, and no attempt was made to discover any mutual or
pecuniary interest in the visit. The court said : "The fact that
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the plaintiff was induced by the defendant to enter upon a
dangerous place, without warning, is the negligence which
entitles the plaintiff to recover." The only possible ground
upon which a mutuality of interest could be assumed in this
case would be, that the church was intended for just the
purpose for which the plaintiff attempted to enter it. But
wherein would the case then differ from a private drawing
room to which a guest has been especially invited, or the
hotel where the guest suffered his injury in: Southcote v.
Stanley, supra.
These cases are not only opposed to the rule as laid down
in the text books, but they show a fatal weakness in it, as in both
cases the rule would have barred a recovery, and in both the
decision of the court appears to everyone as fair and necessary
under the circumstances.
The solution of the difficulty probably lies in the division
.of the subject into express and implied invitation, and limiting
-the mutuality rule to the latter class only. Such a destruction is hinted at by Bigelow (Torts, 326), where he says: "In
regard to this class, it is to be observed that if there be no
actual invitation to the injured person to go upon the premises in question, in order to recover damages for the injuries
sustained, he must have gone upon the premises for business
with the occupier," and see the same thought, in Cooley' on
Torts, 604-7 ; Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426 (1892).
Likewise, the cases just noticed are in harmony with such
a theory, for in both the injured party was expressly invited
into danger, and, consequently, within the class of express
invitation cases. And the reason of such a solution of the
problem cannot but be apparent. The cqntractual element,
which Wharton assumes in the duty owed by a property
owner to one who enters thereon upon business, although convenient, is not, it is submitted, a proper basis for a settlement
of his rights. Every one owes to every one else a certain
degree of care with respect both to his own actions and to
any property which he may possess, and that care is in proportion to the extent to which such person has put himself
under his protection of the other, and in proportion to the
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care which it is jossible to exercise, considering the circumstances of the particular case. The trespasser is entitled to
nothing, because he is a trespasser of whose presence the
owner of the premises is unaware. The licensee tacitly
assumes the risk of any ordinary danger, and, consequently,
beyond notice of hidden pitfalls or traps, the owner is relieved
of responsibility. But an invited person is acting, as it were,
under the direct command or direction of his host, and
because of this confidence reposed in the host an action will
lie if injury follows. It is a result springing directly from the
relation of the parties, and this relation, it is submitted, can
as well be raised by an express invitation to a social guest as
to a business caller. "The fact that the plaintiff was induced
to enter into a dangerous place without warning is the negligence, which entitles the plaintiff to recover."
The position and rights of a social visitor without "express" invitation is a new and very interesting one for a discussion of which is cited Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426
(1892).

"C.C."
Philadelphia,March 12, 1895.

